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Abstract
This paper studies the scenario where data in business
documents is aggregated by different entities via the use
of web services in streamlined business processes. The
documents are transported within the Simple Object Ac-
cess Protocol (SOAP) messages and travel through multi-
ple intermediary entities, each potentially makes changes
to the data in the documents. The WS-Security provides
integrity protection by allowing portions of a SOAP message
to be signed using eXtensible Markup Language (XML)
signature scheme. This method however, has not considered
the situation where a portion of data may be modified by
another entity, therefore a need to allow the originating
system to control which intermediary entity is authorized
to change which portion of the data. The XML signature
scheme also does not provide the final recipient the trust
for the intermediary entity that makes the changes. In our
paper, we study the security requirements for a streamlined
business process, and proposes a novel scheme using san-
itizable signature on SOAP messages to complement the
XML signature to address not only integrity protection but
also control of change as well as establishment of trust for
intermediary entities. We show how the proposed scheme
can be incorporated into the existing standards and be
customizable to achieve flexible use of both the vanilla and
sanitizable signatures as required in a business scenario.
With the proposed technique, IT systems can be more loosely
coupled and reap the benefits of distributed systems, such as
delegation of work and encapsulation of business logic.
1. Introduction
System integration has been a challenge since organiza-
tions started deploying loosely-coupled distributed systems
that are adaptable and capable of handling complexities. The
challenges include the need to support cross-platform and
cross-programming-language interactions. Such challenges
are in part addressed by web services, a cross-platform,
cross-programming-language technology that allows a set of
operations to be exposed over the Internet using standard
communication protocols (e.g. SOAP [11] over HTTP) and
data representations (e.g. XML). In general, web services
are used for point-to-point integrations, and for enabling
business process automation that may have information
flows spanning across organizations. We term the latter as
web-service-enabled business process in this paper.
An automated web-service-enabled business process is
able to reap the benefits of decoupled systems by having
work delegation. Each application within the business pro-
cess is entrusted to perform a particular set of functions
without having to interact repeatedly with a centralized con-
troller. In such a process, information in a business document
may be encapsulated in a SOAP envelope, and traverse to
multiple systems before reaching the final recipient. For
example, a business document such as purchase order may
traverse from an ordering system to fulfillment system and
to billing system, each may need to modify or add data
to the purchase order. In practice, such a business process
is deployable only if the message can be trusted, proven
free from unauthorized changes, authenticated, changes be
controlled and accounted for by the respective entities.
To address message integrity, WS-Security [7] defines
how to attach signatures to SOAP messages using XML sig-
nature [3]. XML signatures provide the ability to selectively
sign the pieces of XML data that each entity may update
in a business process. Although the WS-Security signature
scheme is able to ensure integrity of the data, authenticate
the message originator and make intermediaries accountable
for the changes, it has overlooked a few important issues.
Firstly, it is not able to handle data that requires changes
by another entity. Secondly, it does not allow the originator
of the business document to control which portion of the
data that can be modified by which intermediary. Thirdly,
it does not establish trust of the intermediary for the final
recipient without using communication-expensive trust as-
sertions. Finally, it is not clear to the intermediary, which
portion of the data it is allowed to change without having
extensive encryption or access control configurations within
the document.
Although some of the issues mentioned above, such as
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Figure 1. Quotation Response Process: Running example of a web-service-enabled business process
trust, may be partially addressed with extensive use of WS-
*1 policy-based configurations, we are motivated to find a
succinct solution to all the issues above by seamlessly in-
corporating sanitizable signature [1] in SOAP messages. We
illustrate the problem by first applying the XML signature to
an example web-service-enabled business process. Through
the example, we elicit the capabilities and limitations of
the XML signature scheme. We then propose and apply a
scheme that incorporates sanitizable signature to the example
business process. In our analysis for the proposed scheme,
we demonstrate that the new scheme not only provides data
integrity, authentication and accountability as with the XML
signature, it can also overcome the limitations of the XML
signatures by achieving control of source and extent of infor-
mation change and establishment of trust for intermediary.
Finally, we present a preliminary implementation design
for integrating sanitizable signature with the existing WS-
Security standards.
In the related works, several efforts [5][6][8][9] focus on
issues of unauthorized modifications of SOAP messages by
intermediaries through XML rewriting. Their proposals use
either policy-based configurations or the concept of SOAP
account to detect these modifications. In contrast, we focus
on authorized modifications to SOAP messages. The work
in [12] uses extensive policy-based configurations to control
and authorize changes in an XML document. This approach
requires the entities to understand the specific proposed
policy language. In our work, we focus on using a concise
method of using sanitizable signature scheme for control
and authorization and adhere closely to standards governed
in [3][7]. Another application of sanitizable signature is pro-
posed for end-to-end authentication in intermediary-enabled
multimedia delivery systems [2], where intermediary proxies
are allowed to make modifications such as transcoding of
the multimedia artifacts, yet the validity of the originator’s
signature is preserved. Our work here differs from that of [2]
in several important aspects. We propose a model and study
the implications of applying both the XML signature and
the sanitizable signature, respectively, to SOAP messages in
web-service-based streamlined business processes. We give
detailed design specifications on how to incorporate both
signature schemes seamlessly in WS-Security standards in
order to satisfy security needs as per required by different
1. WS-* is used to denote other web service security standards such as
WS-Policy and WS-Trust.
business processes. We illustrate, using an example business
process, the need for such a hybrid scheme.
2. The Application Scenario
We illustrate the problem and application scenario through
an example business process involving distribution of elec-
tronic appliances such as television sets. This shall be used
as a running example throughout the paper.
2.1. Quotation Response Process: A Web-Service-
Enabled Business Process
Consider a company called Electronic Distributor that dis-
tributes electronic products from a manufacturer Electronic
Manufacturer to a large number of retailers. Electronic
Distributor manages its own warehouse operations but has
outsourced delivery services to a transportation company
Fast Delivery. Electronic Distributor and Fast Delivery have
a pre-negotiated agreement on the delivery charges for its
retailers and Fast Delivery is trusted to provide accurate
delivery charges for the retailer’s purchases based on the
ship-to address. The Electronic Manufacturer is responsible
to provide additional information about the products based
on the retailer’s information, e.g., regulatory test results or
warranty terms that could vary from country to country,
depending on the location of the retailer.
With reference to Figure 1, we consider a simple business
process – Quotation Response Process, involving Electronic
Distributor, Fast Delivery and Electronic Manufacturer. We
assume that a business document Quotation (in XML format
as shown in Figure 2) is transferred between various entities
with use of document-styled web services.
The Quotation Response process begins when Electronic
Distributor receives a Request for Quotation (RFQ) from a
retailer, Electronic Retailer. Electronic Distributor generates
the Quotation using the Order Management System (OMS)
by providing quotes for each item and the taxes associated.
Thereafter, the OMS forwards the Quotation document to the
Fast Delivery’s Shipping System via a SOAP message. Upon
receipt of document, the Shipping System inputs the delivery
cost, delivery information and updates the total cost. After
which, it forwards the document to the Electronic Manufac-
turer’s Product System. Similarly, the Product System inputs
the additional product information based on the retailer’s
information and finally forwards the Quotation to Electronic
Structure of Quotation Document
01. <Quotation>
02. <Customer>
03. ...customer information...
04. </Customer>
05. <Items>
06. (<Item>...item information...</Item>)+
07. </Items>
08. <Shipping>
09. ...shipping information & cost...
10. </Shipping>
11. <TotalCost>
12. (<Tax>...tax information...</Tax>)*
13. <Total>...total cost...</Total>
14. </TotalCost>
15. <PdtInfo>
16. ...Addition Product information...
17. </PdtInfo>
18. </Quotation>
Figure 2. Structure of the Quotation document
Retailer. Upon receipt of the document, Electronic Retailer
updates Electronic Distributor to inform the latter that the
quotation has been received. Table 1 shows the portion of
the data within the Quotation that are updated or inserted
by each system.
XML Element Updated by
Customer/Items/Tax OMS
Shipping Shipping System
Total OMS & Shipping System
PdtInfo Product System
Table 1. XML elements & updating systems
2.2. Security Requirement Analysis for the Process
As seen in the process above, a business document Quota-
tion is transferred from system to system crossing organiza-
tional network boundaries via SOAP. As with any business
data, such a document raises basic security concerns such as
revelations and integrity of data. Focusing only on integrity-
related aspects in this paper, we list in the following common
security requirements for such a business process. We use
the term entity to refer to a system or a party in the process.
We begin the analysis from the perspective of Electronic
Distributor. The security requirements contains two aspects,
i) Integrity: The need to prevent unauthorized modifications
between the originating entity (OMS) and the final receiving
entity (Procurement System) as the Quotation passes through
two intermediaries. The OMS must ensure that appropriate
parts of the Quotation are protected such that the data it
places in the document does not get changed while another
part of the document may be updated by intermediaries;
ii) Control: The originating entity (OMS) needs to control
which intermediary has the right to modify a specific portion
of data. For example, only the Shipping System has the right
to insert shipping information and only the Product System
has the right to insert additional product information. In ad-
dition, if a particular piece of data needs to be updated by the
originator and another intermediary, then the originator can
authorize the intermediary to perform the update, preferably
without having the need to re-endorse the changes in order
to minimize communications between entities and promote
loosely-coupled systems.
From the viewpoint of Electronic Retailers, the security
requirements are four-folded: i) Integrity: The Procurement
System must be able to verify that there is no unauthorized
changes to the data in Quotation before it reaches itself;
ii) Authenticity: When Procurement System receives the
Quotation, it needs to verify that the information comes
from the right sources, i.e., prices are quoted by Electronic
Distributor and product specifications are endorsed by Elec-
tronic Manufacturer; iii) Accountability: Since Quotation is
modified along the process, it must ensure that each entity
be held accountable for the changes. This is also to ensure
non-repudiation; finally iv) Trust for Intermediaries: As out-
sourcing, decentralization and specialization have become
prevalent in businesses today, it is inevitable to increasingly
involve more business partners within a business process.
In our example, Electronic Distributor has outsourced the
delivery services to Fast Delivery. However, to a customer
like Electronic Retailer, its main concern is likely to be about
striking a business transaction and may not be concerned
about whether the transportation services has been out-
sourced. Therefore, Electronic Retailer may not be aware of
the delivery agreement between Electronic Distributor and
Fast Delivery and may not trust the information (e.g., cost
and shipment terms) entered by Fast Delivery. As such, there
is a need to provide the final recipient an evidence of trust
for the information changed or inserted by intermediaries.
Finally, from the viewpoint of the intermediary entities,
there are two security requirements, they are i) integrity: The
intermediary entities need to ensure that the information they
added or modified is not changed by other entities and no
other entity can make the changes on behalf of them; and
ii) Accountability: The intermediary entities need to know if
they are accountable for the changes.
Our objective in this paper is to find a solution that could
satisfy all the requirements in a concise manner.
3. Application of Signature Schemes to Quota-
tion Response Process
This section evaluates how the two signature schemes, the
standard XML signature scheme and sanitizable signature
scheme can be applied to streamlined business processes
such as the Quotation Response process. For easy reference,
we refer the existing standard XML signature in WS-
Security as the vanilla XML signature.
To ensure consistency, we first explain some of the
standard notations used in the paper. Let m be a SOAP
message and si be the set of transformed XML element
references (ref1, ref2, ...,refn) within m that are protected
using a single signature, i.e., ref1∪ref2∪...∪refn = si and
si ⊆ m. Since there could exist more than one signature,
each protecting a set of references within the same SOAP
message, the index i denotes the ith signature within m.
Digital signatures are performed on hashes of the data. Let
H denote a secure collision-resistant hash function such as
SHA1 and let H(refj) = hj , i. e., hj is the hash value of
the jth reference refj in si. The collection of hashes(h1,
h2,...,hj) are then put into a single SignedInfo element,
SIi, in the SOAP header. A signature σi is then generated
over SIi. Each entity in our model has a pair of private-
public keys,(PKsys,SKsys), where PK denotes the public
key used for verification, SK the private key used for
signing or modification and the subscript sys denotes the
owner (entity) of the key pair.
3.1. Using Existing Vanilla XML Signature Scheme
For consistency and ease of explanation later, we provide
a formal model of the vanilla XML signature scheme.
3.1.1. The Model. The vanilla XML signature scheme
consists of three algorithms: key generation, signing and
verification.
Signature Key Generation: The key used for signature
can be of any digital signature scheme. Certification and
revocation of the keys are usually performed by a Certi-
fication Authority. The key generation algorithm KeyGen
is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes an
input security parameter 1k. For each entity in the business
process,
(PKsys, SKsys) ←− KeyGen(1k)
Sign: The signing operation involves the canonicalization
[10] on each SIi, transformation for each refj , hash and
the signature operation. The signature may use an optional
random number z. For each si, we form the SignedInfo
element, SIi in the header by including one or more hashes,
i.e. h1, h2,..., hn. The signature is generated by
σi ←− Sign(SKsys, [z], SIi)
Verify: The verification algorithm is a deterministic algo-
rithm involving canonicalization on each SIi, transformation
for each refj , hashing and verification of each references
and usual signature verification operation over SIi. Given
σi, SIi, hj , and the newly computed hash h′j of refj , for j
= 1, 2, ..., n,
(1, 0) ←− VerifyHash(hj ,h′j)
(1, 0) ←− Verify(PKsys, [z], σi, SIi)
3.1.2. Application of Vanilla XML Signature to Quota-
tion Response Process. The application of vanilla XML
signature is straightforward. Based on the Quotation doc-
ument shown in Figure 2, a total of three signatures are
generated. The first signature is generated and signed by
the originating system OMS on elements <Customer>,
<Items> and <Tax>. The second signature is generated and
signed by the Shipping System on the element <Shipping>.
Recall that once an element is signed, changes made to it by
any intermediary would invalidate the signature. Therefore,
the signatures must be scoped such that each entity signs
only the portion where it is responsible and leaves the
modifiable parts open. With this restriction, we note that
the <Total>, an element that needs to be updated by both
the OMS and the Shipping system, cannot be handled easily.
One possible way to overcome the problem is having the
Shipping System signs on behalf of OMS. Another possibility
is to leave the element unsigned but to ensure that the field
can be re-computed by the final recipient. For the purpose of
comparison with our proposed scheme, we shall adopt the
former approach. Finally, the third signature is generated
by the Product System on element <PdtInfo>. In Figure
3, the portion labeled with “using vanilla XML signature”
provides the pictorial view of the application of vanilla XML
signature to Quotation Response process.
3.1.3. Evaluation of the Scheme. We evaluate the scheme
according to the security requirements listed in Section 2.2.
From the viewpoint of the originating entity, i.e., Elec-
tronic Distributor, the integrity is partially achieved. It is
achieved if the data is solely modifiable by a single entity.
However, if there are data items such as <Total>, that are
modifiable by another entity, then there is no assurance that
the data is not changed before the intermediary makes the
modification. This signature scheme does not allow the mes-
sage originator to control which intermediary has the ability
to change which portion of the SOAP message. Although
control may be made possible by combination of other WS-
* specifications and encryption, they introduce additional
complexity and overheads into the SOAP message, above
and beyond the overhead introduced by XML signature.
From the viewpoint of the final recipient, Electronic Re-
tailer, integrity is also only partially achievable since some
data can be modified by another entity. As for authenticity,
since all modifications by intermediary entities are signed,
final recipient can authenticate each part of the data as
identified by the signer of each signature. Each signer is also
accountable for the respective changes. However, there is no
single entity whom can be held accountable for the entire
document. As such, the final recipient Electronic Retailer
needs to establish separately, the trust relationships with all
the entities in order to verify integrity and authenticity of
the document. This in practice can be a complicated task to
establish the business relationships between the originator
and all its business partners.
From the viewpoint of the intermediary entities, Fast De-
livery and Electronic Manufacturer, similarly, the integrity
is partially addressed. If the information is signed, integrity
can be preserved. However, for parts of information that have
yet to have a signature (such as the <Total> element), the
 <soap:Body>
   <Quotation>
     <Customer id=”customer”>..data..</Customer>
     <Items id=”items”>…data…</Items>
     <Shipping id=”shipping”>..empty..</Shipping>
     <TotalCost>
         <Tax id=”tax”>…data...</Tax>
         <Total id=”total”>$X</Total>
     </TotalCost>
     <PdtInfo id=”pdtInfo”>..empty..</PdtInfo >
   </Quotation>
 </soap:Body>
 <soap:Body>
   <Quotation>
     <Customer id=”customer”>..data..</Customer>
     <Items id=”items”>…data…</Items>
     <Shipping id=”shipping”>..data..</Shipping>
     <TotalCost>
         <Tax id=”tax”>…data...</Tax>
         <Total id=”total”>$Y</Total>
     </TotalCost>
     <PdtInfo id=”pdtInfo”>..empty..</PdtInfo >
   </Quotation>
 </soap:Body>
  <soap:Body>
    <Quotation>
      <Customer id=”customer”>..data..</Customer>
      <Items id=”items”>…data…</Items>
      <Shipping id=”shipping”>..data..</Shipping>
      <TotalCost>
          <Tax id=”tax”>…data...</Tax>
          <Total id=”total”>$Y</Total>
      </TotalCost>
      <PdtInfo id=”pdtInfo”>..data..</PdtInfo >
    </Quotation>
  </soap:Body>
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Figure 3. Application of both signature schemes to Quotation Response process
intermediary entities cannot verify that they are not changed.
Since all changes are signed, the intermediary entities are
accountable for the changes.
With Quotation Response process, we can see that there
are some limitations in using the vanilla XML signature.
3.2. Using Sanitizable Signature
To overcome the limitations of the vanilla XML signature
in meeting the security requirements for our example busi-
ness process, we propose a new approach which employs
both sanitizable signature [1] and the vanilla XML signature.
3.2.1. Sanitizable Signature Overview. A sanitizable sig-
nature allows authorized intermediaries to modify parts of a
signed message without interacting with the original signer,
and without invalidating the original signature. Its main
benefit is that modifications are enabled in a “limited and
controlled fashion”[1], and allowing recipient to verify only
a single signature with the modifications. In the context of
the Quotation Response process, it allows an intermediary
such as Shipping System to add shipping cost to the Quo-
tation while keeping the original signature by Electronic
Distributor valid. The basic notion of this scheme makes
use of a trapdoor hash function that is first applied to the
message and then the resulting hash value is signed by
the digital signature algorithm such as RSA. Thereafter, an
intermediary, who knows the secret key to the trapdoor,
is able to find a collision to the hash function such that
amendment can be made to the message and yet producing
the same digest value, keeping the signature intact. The basic
operations of sanitizable signature scheme [1] is as follows:
The private-public key pair for an intermediary: A
pair of public-private keys is required for an intermediary.
An example of the key pair is the following. Let p and q be
prime numbers such that p = 2q + 1. Obtain g, a generator
of the subgroup of squares of order q. The private key x is
selected at random in [1, q − 1]. The public and private key
pair is defined as (y = gx, x).
The trapdoor hash function: The hash function is based
on the chameleon hash [4] on (refj , r), where r is a random
number pair, r = (ρ, δ) ∈ Zq × Zq and refj is the jth
reference within the XML message m that will be protected
by a signature σi. Let H be a regular collision-resistant hash
function such as SHA1. The trapdoor hash function is in the
form THy(refj , ρ, δ) = ρ − (yegδ mod p) mod q where
e = H(refj , ρ). Note that the trapdoor is created using the
public key y.
Collision computation: Given a hash value ν =
THy(refj , ρ, δ), the intermediary with the private key x can
compute a collision for the modified refj ′ as follows. First
choose a random value k′ ∈ [1, q−1]. Compute three values,
(1) ρ′ = ν + (gk
′
mod p) mod q, (2) e′ = H(refj ′, ρ′) and
(3) δ′ = k′−e′x mod q. Putting the newly computed ρ′ and
e′ into the trapdoor hash function, we have ν′ = ν + (gk
′
mod p) mod q − (gxe′gδ′ mod p) mod q. Substituting
value of δ′ as in (3), we get ν′ = ν + (gk
′
mod p) mod
q−(gxe′+k′−e′x mod p) mod q = ν. Therefore, (refj ′, ρ′, δ′)
is the collision of the chameleon hash function that would
result in the same signature for the referenced element within
the XML message.
3.2.2. General Approach for Using Sanitizable Signa-
ture. The general approach to apply sanitizable signature
to SOAP message is: i) the portions of data that do not
require modification by intermediary entity uses the usual
hash function; ii) the portion of data that requires changes
by an intermediary uses a trapdoor hash function; iii) the
signature generation remains the same, i.e., generated over
the entire <SignedInfo> element which may contain one or
more hash values.
3.2.3. The Model. The use of sanitizable signature consists
of four algorithms: key generation, signing, modification and
verification.
Signature Key Generation: Similar to vanilla XML
signature, key generation uses a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm. A pair of private-public keys is given to
each entity. Let (PKsys0, SKsys0) denote the key pair for
the originator and (PKint, SKint) the key pair for an
intermediary. Note that the private key and public key for
the originator is for standard signature generation and verifi-
cation respectively, while the public key and private key for
the intermediary is for computing a trapdoor hash function
and for collision computation respectively. Without loss of
generality, assuming that there is only one intermediary, we
have
(PKsys0, SKsys0, PKint, SKint)←− KeyGen(1k)
Sign: The signing operation involves hash on each refer-
ence section and the signature operation. For each reference
refj , the hash value hj is produced either using H or
TH depending on whether it is modifiable. If TH is used,
random coins rj and the public key of the intermediary
PKint are used in generating the hash value with the
trapdoor. The signature σi, is then generated using the
private key of the originating system SKsys0 over the SIi,
where SIi contains a collection of hashes h1,...,hn. Let z be
an optional random number for signature generation. Then
hj ←− either TH(PKint, rj , refj) or H(refj)
σi ←− Sign(SKsys0, [z], SIi)
Modify: The intermediary can make modification to the
specified reference refj authorized by the originator. The
intermediary uses its private key SKint to recompute new
random coins rj ′ required to generate a collision for the
trapdoor hash hj . For each modified reference element ref ′j ,
hj ←− TH(SKint, rj ′, refj ′)
SIi and σi remains the same
Verify: The verification operation involves the hash and
the signature verification operation. For each referenced
section refj , the hash value hj is reproduced either using H
or TH depending on whether it is modifiable. If TH is used,
the new random coins rj ′ and the corresponding public key
of the intermediary PKint are used to regenerate the hash.
The signature σi, is then verified using the public key of the
originator SKsys0 over the collection of hashes hj .
h′j ←− either TH(PKint, rj ′, refj ′) or H(ref ′j)
(1, 0) ←− VerifyHash(hj ,h′j)
(1, 0) ←− Verify(PKsys0, [z], σi, SIi)
3.2.4. Application of Sanitizable Signature to Quotation
Response Process. Consider the same Quotation Response
process as shown in Figure 1, we show that a single signature
is sufficient to sign all the necessary data with use of
sanitizable signature. The originating entity can now control
which reference element in the XML document contains a
trapdoor such that it can be modified by an intermediary.
In our business process example, the OMS creates a
sanitizable signature σ1 with (1) regular hash function H
over the elements <Customer>, <Items> and <Tax>, (2)
a trapdoor hash function over elements <Shipping> and
<Total> using PKshipping and (3) a second trapdoor hash
function over element <PdtInfo> using PKproduct. The
signature is signed by OMS using SKoms. With this signa-
ture, Shipping System can modify elements <Shipping> and
<Total> using SKshipping and Product System can modify
<PdtInfo> using SKproduct. In Figure 3, the portion labeled
with “using sanitizable signature” provides the pictorial
view of the application of sanitizable signature to Quotation
Response process.
3.2.5. Evaluation of the Scheme. Similarly, we evaluate the
new scheme according to the security requirements defined
in Section 2.2. From the viewpoint of the originator Elec-
tronic Distributor, the data integrity protection can now be
extended to data that are modifiable by another entity, hence
satisfying the integrity requirement. This scheme allows the
originating entity to control which intermediary has the
ability to change a specified portion of the SOAP message.
In our example, only the Shipping System (belonging to Fast
Delivery) can modify data in <Shipping> and <Total>,
and only the Product System (belonging to Electronic Man-
ufacturer) can modify data in <PdtInfo>. This is enforced
because only the systems with the corresponding private
key can recompute the trapdoor hash function without
invalidating the original signature. In addition, there is an
added advantage of providing the flexibility to the originat-
ing entity to decide which business partner to work with
at the start of the business process. For example, in our
scenario, Electronic Distributor may work with different
transportation companies either based on the location of the
retailer or based on load-balancing distribution of work. In
such situation, the Electronic Distributor could then control
to which transportation company it assigns the task by
creating the trapdoor hash using the public key of the
assigned company.
From the viewpoint of the final recipient Electronic Re-
tailer, the integrity protection is achieved as data that is
modifiable by both originating and intermediary entities can
now be handled. As a result of the use of sanitizable signa-
ture, the Electronic Retailer receives only a single signature
signed by the originator Electronic Distributor, hence au-
thenticating the business document as a whole as though the
information comes entirely from the originator. In addition,
our proposed scheme allows orginator to flexibly decide
which portion of the data to be authenticated by which
entity. For example, since the additional product information
is updated only by the Electronic Manufacturer’s Product
System, and it is a type of information that the end recipient
could trust (i.e., it is commonly required that regulatory
information or warranty information come directly from the
manufacturer), the product information can be signed by the
Electronic Manufacturer using the vanilla XML signature.
Each change to the document is also accounted for as
only the entity that is authorized to make the changes can
successfully recompute the random coins required by the
trapdoor hash function. We will show in Section 4 that
the retailer can verify that the random coins are changed
and use the new coins to verify the hashes. If trapdoor
hashes are verified, we can deduce that modifications is
performed by the intermediary entity holding the secret key.
Finally, the trust for intermediaries can be established using
the proposed scheme. Although the intermediaries are not
entirely transparent to the recipient as it still requires the
intermediaries’ public keys to recompute the hashes, the
recipient is aware that only intermediaries specified by the
originating entity can successfully recompute the random
coins for the trapdoor hash that matches the modified data.
Therefore, they are authorized and trusted intermediaries.
From the viewpoint of the intermediary entities, Fast
Delivery and Electronic Manufacturer, the integrity is sat-
isfied since information such as <Total> element can be
first signed by originator and be modified by an authorized
intermediary. As per the discussion for final recipient, we
will illustrate in Section 4 that intermediary entities are
accountable for the changes. Therefore, we can see that all
the security requirements can be satisfied by combined use
of sanitizable signature and vanilla XML signature. In the
next section, we will show how we can allow co-existence
of both schemes.
4. Implementation Design
We propose in the following, a preliminary design (with
references to specification of XML Signature [3]) to in-
corporate the use of sanitizable signature in actual imple-
mentations. The main difference between the vanilla XML
signature and sanitizable signature is the hash function
algorithms, i.e., the DigestMethod for each reference. The
trapdoor hash function used in sanitizable signature requires
additional information such as KeyInfo (of the intermediary
who is allowed to modify the reference section), the original
random coins and the new random coins computed by the
authorized intermediary. Figure 4 shows the schema for
the standard DigestMethod as defined in WS-Security. The
provision of the <any> element at Line 04 enables us to
extend the XML document with elements not specified by
the schema. Therefore, we propose to place the additional
information required by the trapdoor hash function as part
of child element within DigestMethod. As the DigestMethod
lies within the SignedInfo element, we also need to make
provision to allow new random coins to be placed by
intermediaries without invalidating the signature. The Signa-
ture element has a provision to include <Object> element
(schema as shown in Figure 5) as an extension to include
more information for the signature. We use this extension to
place the new random coins required to verify the trapdoor
hash function. In short, we propose to place (1) the KeyInfo
of the intermediary, original random coins and a reference
to the new random coins within the DigestMethod and (2)
the new random coins in the extension Object element.
Schema of Digest Method
01. <complexType name="DigestMethodType"
02. mixed="true">
03. <sequence>
04. <any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
05. minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
06. </sequence>
07. <attribute name="Algorithm" type="anyURI"
08. use="required"/>
09. </complexType>
Figure 4. Schema of DigestMethod in SignedInfo
Schema of Object Element
01. <element name="Object" type="ds:ObjectType"/>
02. <complexType name="ObjectType" mixed="true">
03. <sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
04. <any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"/>
05. </sequence>
06. <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/>
07. <attribute name="MimeType" type="string" use="optional"/>
08. <attribute name="Encoding" type="anyURI" use="optional"/>
09. </complexType>
Figure 5. Schema of Object extension
A Sample Implementation of Sanitizable Signature
01.<Signature>
02. <SignedInfo>
03. <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://
www.w3.org/TR/2000/CR-xml-c14n-20001026"/>
04. <SignatureMethod Algorithm="...#rsa-sha1"/>
05. <Reference URI="#Ref_1">
06. <Transforms/>
07. <DigestMethod Algorithm="...URI to trapdoor
hash specifications...">
08. <Random-rho>384474..</Random-rho>
09. <Random-delta>98327..</Random-delta>
10. <Digest-KeyInfo>
11. ...Key Info of Intermediary...
12. </Digest-KeyInfo>
13. <New-Random-Ref>#Ref_new</New-Random-Ref>
14. </DigestMethod>
15. <DigestValue>j6x3rvEPO0vK...</DigestValue>
16. </Reference>
17. </SignedInfo>
18. <Object>
19. <New-Random Id="Ref_new">
20. <New-Random-rho>384474..</New-Random-rho>
21. <New-Random-delta>98327..</New-Random-delta>
22. </New-Random>
23. ...other info e.g., SignatureProperty...
24. </Object>
25. <SignatureValue>MCrVLtRlk=...</SignatureValue>
26. <KeyInfo>...Key Info of Originator...</KeyInfo>
27.</Signature>
Figure 8. A sample implementation of saniti-Figure 6. A sample implementation of sanitizable sig-
nature
Figure 6 shows a sample implementation of a sanitizable
signature (namespace prefixes are omitted). Line 07 specifies
the hash function used for the referenced element. Lines
08−09 provide and commit the original random coins used
in the trapdoor hash function. Line 10− 12 specifies which
intermediary is allowed to change the element referenced
and also provides the final recipient with the key information
required to retrieve the public key for re-generation of the
hash value. Line 13 specifies the location where the new
random coins (computed by intermediary) could be found.
Lines 18−24 show the placement of the new random coins.
The new random-coin elements would be empty initially and
only be filled by the intermediary. Finally, lines 25 and 26
provide the signature value and the key information of the
original signer respectively.
In this design, there is an implicit verification that the
intermediary has made changes to the new random coins.
The original random coins and the reference to the new
coins are included in the signature by the originator and
hence remained unchanged if it passes signature verification.
Recall that only the entity with the private key can recompute
the right new random coins that correspond to the new
data. The new random coins in lines 20 and 21, although
not signed, if they could produce the correct trapdoor
hash, we can deduce that the new coins are issued by the
authorized intermediary. This is to ensure accountability of
the corresponding data received by the final recipient.
We can see that with this design, sanitizable signature can
be incorporated into the existing XML signature standards
by effective use of extensions provided in the schema. This
design also allows co-existence of (1) both regular hash and
trapdoor hash in a single signature and (2) both signature
schemes in a SOAP message. Such a capability provides
backward compatibility and flexibility for mix-and-match
depending on the business requirements.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the practical message integrity,
trust, change control, authenticity and accountability require-
ments of business documents (wrapped in SOAP message)
that undergo modifications in web-service-enabled business
processes. We presented with an example, a business process
where use of the vanilla XML signature scheme as specified
by WS-Security, is not sufficient in fully satisfying the
security requirements. This is because the XML signature
scheme is unable to handle data that requires modification
by another entity, it does not allow originating entity to
control the information that can be changed and does not
establish trust for the intermediary entities. We then intro-
duced the use of sanitizable signature as a concise solution
to complement and overcome the limitations of the vanilla
XML signature scheme. We illustrated using the example,
that when used together with vanilla XML signature, we
can now satisfy the security needs of the process. As the
security requirements of each process and each pair of cross-
organizational integration are different, we would envision
that both XML signature and sanitizable signature schemes
be flexibly deployed and co-exist to suit the needs of a
particular business process. The proposed scheme is specifi-
cally suitable for situations in which the entities involved in
changing the SOAP messages are decided by the originating
entity. The proposed scheme strongly encourages decoupled
systems and delegation of tasks to trusted entities in the
business process, hence avoiding being overwhelmed with
the work of coordination and consolidation of information
from various entities by a single centralized entity.
In summary, the main benefit of use of sanitizable signa-
ture is to empower the message originator to delegate the
intermediary entities to make changes in the “limited and
controlled” [1] manner while protecting the data integrity
with a single signature. However, the benefits of such a
scheme would be diluted in the case of a dynamic situation
involving dynamic composition of web services and routing.
Going forward, a promising direction for future work is to
design a similar scheme that is suited for an environment
with dynamic composition of web services.
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